Introduction 1
Shaped by the historiography of the early modern centuries, the myth of Venice portrays it as an ideal republic founded on wise laws and the public spirit of a ruling elite devoted to the service of the state, governing a strong maritime empire and a largely autonomous Italian mainland state (Terraferma) . Alongside this benevolent view, there emerged a countermyth depicting the Serenissima as a repressive state, governed by a secretive, tyrannical oligarchy; in this portrayal the Council of Ten (Consiglio dei Dieci), the Republic's supreme judicial body, is often represented as a "tribunal of blood". The myth first emerged as a representation of the city in the late Middle Ages, when its fleets and overseas commerce were both substance and symbol of Venetian magnificence. The countermyth began to take shape in the mid fifteenth century, when Venice extended its control over Italian mainland towns such as Padua, Verona, Vicenza and others, whose political liberties were supposedly suffocated. Many generations of historians largely contented themselves with these two contrasting stereotyped representations, and only in the past three decades have scholars actually explored the internal working of the mainland state and related it to the myth itself. Thank to recent research on Venetian and mainland social history it is now in fact possible to detect an almost incessantly fluid situation in terms of the composition of status groups, the interweaving of interests, the handling and balance of power, etc.
2
In the early modern period Italy's regional states were quite unlike Europe's major monarchies. Italian states had in fact an articulate political structure and a distribution of power not yet dominated by the center. Venetian aristocratic power could hardly be compared to the types of authority that took root in other European and even Italian states. The Venetian pragmatism, jealously conservative, was unable to exploit bureaucratic or hierarchical structures to connect center and periphery and to advance mainland families. Government was in fact based on a conception of sovereignty that boiled down to the rights of Venice's aristocrats, without a more totalizing vision of statehood; the predominant center was never integrated with the peripheral societies, wich often had large cities within them whose identity was thereby squashed.
3
Vicenza proudly proclaimed itself the firstborn of Venice, and indeed when it voluntarily accepted Venetian rule in April 1404 it received the confirmation of a number of privileges favouring local autonomy in both fiscal and jurisdictional matters 1 . Perhaps the most important of them was the confirmation of the ancient magistracy of the Consulate ( Consolato). Among the various Venetian subject cities' courts, this tribunal staffed mainly by jurists belonging to the city's aristocracy was in fact the only one empowered to condemn criminals to death; furthermore in 1545 it also acquired the right to banish certain types of criminals from the whole territory of the Venetian state. The Consulate was the fundamental instrument with which the Vicentine aristocracy was able to manage local conflicts, succeeding in doing so in competition with the Venetian courts both local and central.
4
By the late sixteenth century Venice could no longer tolerate too weak a political control over the mainland and employed diverse tools to assert its supremacy something that also happened in other areas. Considerable interference with subject cities' autonomies accompanied an equally considerable extension of the administrative and judicial power exercised by Venetian magistracies. The Council of Ten then gradually acquiring greater political and judicial importance to the detriment of other, broader bodies more in line with the republican tradition was then particularly important as a source of laws and judgements which weakened the old institutional order that still characterized the great cities of the mainland. Its action in fact heavily diminished the role of local courts, and consequently the overall power of the provincial elites.
5
The old aristocracy of the Terraferma lost political legitimacy and suffered the erosion of its traditional ritual and symbolic importance, and reacted by generating social unrest. The mechanisms governing the ancient practice of the feud, which for centuries had regulated relations among the powerful noble lineages, were violently dislocated under the pressure of new social and political circumstances.
In face of the mounting criticism of their privileges, the growing contempt for their persons, and the erosion of the territorial foundations of their authority, the nobility were foolish enough to attempt a counter-attack, the most visible feature of which was an overweening arrogance, symptomatic of their basis insicurity.
6
Meanwhile in England Elizabeth did her best to protect her nobility from insult 2 , in the Republic of Venice some different social processes were developing quite different outcomes.
Peace and War 7
On 3 April 1585 Guido Capra and Muzio da Porto solemnly embraced each other in the presence of the bishop and the two Venetian governors of Vicenza (podestà and captain), so as to confer solemnity on a act of pacification which was intended to end a long and bloody conflict 3 . The act referred generically to a violent brawl that had occurred ten years previously; it further mentioned a large group of allies of both factions who had been bound to peace and annulled all the legal proceedings that ensued from the conflict of 12August 1575. On that occasion Muzio had seriously injured Guido, and that episode was followed by clashes between armed men, arson attacks on palaces, murders and consequent prosecutions. But what had become open war between the two sides had been smouldering since the end of the 60's, when the artisan Bortolo Balestraro had been attacked in his shop by Alvise Capra and three of his henchmen and had dared to meet violence with violence, leaving his main assailant mortally wounded. Retaliation had followed immediately, all the stronger because at a party the honor of Alvise Capra's sons had been purposely provoked by Ludovico da Porto (son of Bernardino) 4 .
8
Bortolo had died shortly afterwards in Apulia, where he had sought refuge after being permanently banned from Vicenza. The Capras' attention had then turned to Bortolo's uncle and accomplice Iseppo dal Castello, and after various unsuccessful attempts -they had offered 200 ducats to whoever would "cut him to pieces" -on 19 April 1572 hired assassins reached the man in Venice. Although he had been stabbed in the shoulder and knifed in the throat, a sword thrust through his body, Iseppo had miraculously survived. Alvise Capra's son, Guido, the principal defendant in the trial consequently conducted in Venice, revealed then that Iseppo had been protected, paid and pushed towards criminal proceedings by the da Portos, whom he had served "with his arms and his life" 5 .
The 1585 act of pacification, however, contained a clause that betrayed a dangerous weakness: Ludovico da Porto, son of Camillo, had not accepted the agreement. The men of his faction therefore bound themselves not to offer him lodging or help until he had made peace with his enemies.
9
By that time Count Ludovico da Porto had already been banished and condemned to the confiscation of his property by the Council of Ten 6 . His property had been assigned at auction for 1,000 ducats to a man fronting for his family two days before the act of pacification. They had obviously had to forego protection of their over-obstinate relative after recovering his considerable wealth for a nominal sum -a single share of it was later valued at 11,000 ducats -presumably with the tacit consent of their adversaries. The agreement also sealed the reestablishment of the unity of Vicenza's aristocracy in the defence of the ancient privileges granted in 1404, when the city had voluntarily entered the Venetian State. On 4 November 1585 Francesco da Porto and Odorico Capra, acting in the name of the city but evidently also representing their respective factions, were able to appear jointly in Venice to petition for the repeal of limits that the Law of the Five Cases had recently imposed on the Consulate. The law allowed the Venetian governors of the main town of the Terraferma to pursue five particular dangerous crimes: road robberies, domicile robberies, rapes, murders made by masked men and arsons 7 .
Hard Times 10 In times characterized by stable relations and clearly defined roles in power-handling, a peace between opposing groups, even if they go as far as murder, quickly restores the balance via visible adjustments imposed by the mediation of an authority recognized by all the contestants. Pacification therefore becomes the main means whereby a feud reveals its essential function in reestablishing a preexisting order 8 . Should outside intervention -for instance by state authority -instead modify the normal procedures of peacemaking, the restraints on violence cease to function. During periods of rapid social change, the traditional mechanisms controlling rivalry between families are unhinged, pacifications lose their political significance and efficacy, and unrestrained vendetta is set loose 9 .
11 In the decades either side of 1600 the Venetian mainland state was infested with outlaws and armed bands often led by nobles. They disposed of depositories of firearms and scores of satellites (called bravos, or hired henchmen) through whom to spread terror. As well as oppression, violence of every sort and crime, they practised detention in private prisons and unauthorised banishment -the latter actions representing usurpation of sovereign power. In the denunciation presented to the Council of Ten in November 1579 by one of his victims, Ludovico da Porto is portrayed as a stereotype tyrant: he is in fact the sum of all the connotations just mentioned, and exercises tyranny over the property, honor and blood of the poor peasants 10 .
12 But by then the state had already fully grasped the inefficacy of actions which, though hitting criminals hard, barely grazed the nerve centres which sustained their deeds and protected them while they were in hiding. Public order needed to be reestablished with exceptional measures able to strike right to the heart of the groups the outlaws belonged to, by undermining their bases ofwealth. The alarm that the situation caused is confirmed by a series of legislative measures which aimed at stemming criminality by making the penalties more severe even for those who favoured or at least tolerated it. On 26 September 1578 a law promulgated by the Council of Ten against murders pensati and in insidie (respectively premeditated and achieved through ambushes) had prescribed the confiscation of the criminals' property, breaching not only the legitime portion, but also the inviolability of fideicommissa
11
. In such a way there was direct damage to the relatives of young adults who had no legal entitlement to property, and who precisely for this reason had often been used as belligerents by their respective families. Twenty years later podestà Correr could assert that the ancient rivalries finally appeared to be placated since, while the exile imposed by banishment was greatly feared, an even greater threat was the loss of the property with which families give lustre to the fame of lineage and virtue 12 .
create scorched earth around outlaws. In December 1560 the Council of Ten had authorised the killing of anyone caught in flagrante crimine, with specific reference to the role of rural communities, thus attributing a sort of political recognition to them that was later extended in 1574. In 1580 Senate of Venice had assigned extraordinary powers to the mainland governors and decided to intensify collaboration with neighbouring states to favour extradition from them 13 . Thereafter there had been a continuous series of laws on public order. On 28 October 1578 Bernardino Lippomano, former podestà in Vicenza, presented his report to the Senate and complained of the negative consequences of measures whereby outlaws could redeem themselves by killing other outlaws, and requested the confirmation of an earlier law, dated 1502, which had established that an outlaw, after being once freed, could only be freed from any subsequent sentence of banishment via a judicial pardon. Lastly, the promulgation of the already mentioned Law of the five cases in October 1585 had given governors further extraordinary powers in criminal matters 14 .
A composite State 14 Venetian administrators found it necessary to mediate between the various councils, legal bodies and informal institution present in both the subject cities and the countryside surrounding them. Because of its peculiar constitutional organisation, the settlement of many matters requiring mediation and negotiation in the Republic of Venice has been interpreted by historians as the outcome of relations between systems of families, and the process of mainland government in particular as a sort of complex dialectic involving local institutions and interest groups, each of them with its own powers and privileges 15 . The Venetian mainland state was in fact a complex mosaic of diverse political structures: local grandees, feudal lords, patrician elites, privileged corporations and peasant communities. The coexistence of multiple forms of political organization and the interplay of such a variety of institutions also explains not only the survival but also the usefulness of such apparently irrational social practice as feuds and clientage networks. 15 In practical terms this sort of mosaic of power-handling meant the coexistence of various magistracies and courts of justice, both local and central. In Vicenza crimes were generally judged by the Consulate, whose judges were four lawyers and eight nobles, all from Vicenza, together with the Venetian podestà and three other jurists (the Assessori) appointed by him. The courts of the two Venetian governors (the cortepretoria and the corteprefettizia) had criminal competence over fiscal, military and few other types of offences. In some instances the Council of Ten delegated to the city governors extraordinary authority to use the Council's own summary procedure, an authorization that enabled them to override the local statutes and the traditional forms of dispute settlement. In addiction the presumed victim (or the accused) could petition the Council of Ten, asking it to judge the case or delegate it to a Venetian court for trial. He could also ask for the intervention of the Venetian Avogaria, which was a prestigious magistracy with general responsibility for the correct functioning of judicial activity, and the intromissione (procedural interference) of an Avogadore determined the temporary interruption of trial proceeding 16 . 16 In the second half of the sixteenth century new political actors -among them the rural communities of each province organised into representative and administrative bodies 17 Venice's elite families and their equivalent ones in the subjected towns, which in the past could be schematically distinguished by the very values that characterised themmerchants descending from the original Stato da mar (State of the sea) the former, townsfolk and feudal dwellers, however deeply rooted in the property comprising their district, the latter -were sharing a common ideology, and the same entrepreneurial and often competitive effort; they also viewed their territory in terms of economic investment.
18 Yet at the same time, they were separated by the divide resulting from their involvement in the political life of the state as well as by the so-called separatezza giuridica (juridical separation), clearly moulded from the jus commune then in use in the mainland -of which the University of Padua was one of the most prestigious European schools -and from the Statutes in force in Venice; such separation encouraged to a certain extent some sort of equilibrium in the autonomy between the central powers (composed exclusively of members from Venice's nobility) and the periphery (the elite townsfolk) 17 . 19 In the second half of the sixteenth-century the spreading of the ownership of private property by Venetians on the mainland was fostered by the progressive liquidation of public debt initiated in 1577 18 . This was accompanied by the dramatic crisis in the woollen industry. In 1596 theVenetian captainGiacomo Bradadin lamented a slump in the production of cloth goods in the Vicenza area from approximately 3,000 to 200 rolls of cloth per year, a setback which even the contemporary gains in the booming silk industry could not fully overcome 19 . As a result, local elite families would see their patrimonial bases diminished and a subsequent loss in power, while a new social class of parvenus emerged, attempting to usurp the formerly privileged classes and upset the social and economic equilibrium established in the early years of the fifteenth-century. 20 The political situation of Vicenza deteriorated as a result of the antagonism between two factions of rather vague outlines. Seventeen years ago, an important study attempted to delineate the fundamental characteristics of the two groups: the da Porto family had led the oligarchic faction of the ancient Venetian loyalty, while the group led by the Capra family gathered a collection of both old pro-imperial families and the newer members of the wealthy nobility 20 . However, the sources attest to the malleability and adaptability of the alliances and pretensions of faith -for example, many among the da Portos served in the imperial army -which accounted for the frequent shifts among members of the opposing factions 21 . 21 In 1541 Venice establisheda one-year vacancy for the offices of the Council of 100 (Minor Consiglio dei 100)of Vicenza -the true center of local power -consenting the incorporation of some of the new families. These families, throughtheir loyalty to the Capras, were to gradually shift the established balance of power towards the anti-oligarchic faction. The da Portos perceived the nature and dimensions of these adversarial actions in January 1567 -a year that saw the first manifestation of Ludovico's violence -and even attempted an unrealistic "lockout" of the Minor Consiglio. Meanwhile, riots, brawls and murders multiplied exponentially in the form of vendetta feuds, until a "Superintendent for Law and Order" sent from Venice was able to finally restore order and impose the peace of 1585.
22 Merchants, notaries, agrarian capitalists and wealthier townfolk, each belonging to a specific association in their respective power centres -trade corporations, confraternities, professional colleges and territorial boards -would overwhelmingly burst onto the political scene and provoke conflict. Circumventing the hegemony of local law-courts, these protagonists appealed directly to the magistrate of the capital, thus avoiding the control of local oligarchy. Yet, in this case it is necessary to proceed cautiously: very often behind such initiatives the shadow of a probable wheeler-dealer can be seen, as is demonstrated by the example of the denunciation to the Avogaria by Iseppo dal Castello, supported by the da Portos. 23 The major aristocratic families often reacted by appealing to anachronistic conceptions of honour. For the young generation thrust into public limelight, heavily tied to an education organized around the significance of social rank and station, it was not easy to compromise with the world of peasants, merchants and artisans. 24 The younger cadet branch, in particular, often demonstrated an unwillingness to share the leading patriarchs' attempts to mostly safeguard the family estate. The testaments, full of ancient obsolete clauses such as the strong ties of fideicommissa and primogeniture, eventual attempts to boost one's riches by accepting dowries and women even from merchant families and, lastly, the disinheritance of those descendants convicted of serious crimes, filled many people, who considered themselves victims of these quibbling juridical measures and economic stratagems, with indignation 22 . The damaged pride and exasperation of the violated often produced exuberant violence that transformed noble feuds into competitions for those spaces of political power remaining to be had 23 . But the splits produced by these situations did not exhaust their devastating energy either within the violent factions and the private armies which opposed each other in the streets of the city, or in the abuse of power from a myriad of mercenary armed men roaming around the countryside; the emerging figure of fratricidal war was also looming on the horizon 24 .
25 Such violence certainly was not new, but the aristocracy's crisis could hardly contain its manifestations of self-destruction. By diverting the most important criminal trials to the tribunals of Venice and, above all, by authorising the use of their own rito inquisitorio (inquisitorial rite), the Council of Ten strongly limited the power of the Consolati and, with them, the ancient guarantees of compensatory justice.
Pride and Honor
26 It was in this particular context and time that the course of the Count Ludovico da Porto's life unfolded. He was at first a young hero, then a rich landowner, finally an awful criminal. We possess two descriptions of him: the first is given by his proud father Camillo who relates his son's departure with the Christian fleet, the second comes from his worst enemy, the lawyer Lucillo Cereda, and it was forwarded to the Council of Ten for the purposes of da Porto's identification and arrest. According to the first description (about 1570), Ludovico is delighted at leaving his palace to go on board in Pesaro. He is a refined, self-reliant, promising young man and he wants to test himself. A servant and two of his best greyhounds accompany him. In May 1586, some months before his death, he is a thin man with dark hair, a nose bent to one side (probably broken), he stammers Others, such as Giovanni of the mid-fifteenth century, and Ludovico's father Camillo, a century later, were very famous and influential jurists. Paolo, a canon of the cathedral and Simone, the Archdeacon, fought long and hard against the bishop of Vicenza to protect their benefices. The importance of the role played by the da Porto's family in the contemporary humanistic debate, which was linked to Catholic reform and later to Calvinistic reform in Vicenza, has been only recently discovered, while the mercantile and industrial context in which they moved is generally only hinted at.For the whole of the fifteenth century and the first decades of the following century, the da Portos were leaders in the production and trading of silk and wool, the two economic activities that made Vicenza one of the most important industrial districts of the Repubblica: they ran some shops and, although the important Rialto market in Venice was their main market outlet, as manufacturers and merchants they also reached cities as far as Naples, Rome and Lyons. Equally,they were not unrelated to the other productive sectors which included the glass-blowing industry, the extraction of minerals and the production of paper
26
. Iseppo, cousin of Ludovico, was the purchaser of a grand Palladian palace in Vicenza, while around 1580 the Castelvecchio branch of the family had commissioned Andrea Palladio the incomplete palace in piazza Castello, a surreal architectural paradox which unintentionally reflect the cracks within the solidarity of the house. At the beginning of the sixteenth-century the Da Portos were divided into ten branches, the major of which was that of Leonardo the posthumous -born after his father's deathwho was Camillo's father and grandfather of the protagonist of the events we consider 27 . 28 In 1567 Ludovico had forced one of his men to beat the vicar of a bishop. In the successive military battles against the Turks he was probably forced to pay for that episode when the Council of Ten sanctioned a condemnation of three years of confinement in Capodistria. In April 1571 Vicenza had offered 12,000 ducats and two ships to the struggle for the defense of Cyprus which had been attacked by the Turks: the . Ludovico then became the despotic lord of Cresole, a small village near the northern gates of Vicenza. His violent conduct reemerged in 1579 with the wellknown murder of a peasant. The murder led first to his imprisonment in the Torre di Vicenza (a trick of destiny as Lepanto's battleship and the town prison bore the same name) and then to incarceration in the prison of the Council of The Tenin Venice. After five years of pre-trial detention, in 1584 he was condemned to twenty-two years of confinement in Retmo, on the island of Crete, and to the confiscation of capital, resources and property 30 . Having escaped from the ship that would have conducted him to the Aegean island, he immediately returned to Vicenza for revenge. He began to carry out his plan on 21 July 1585 with the assassination of Francesco Cereda, chaplain of the Duomo and parish priest of Cresole. Ludovico planned a brutal and sacrilegious murder: the priest was to be taken by surprise during the celebration of Sunday mass. Da Porto forced all those present to leave the church before savagely attacking him. His body was ravaged by dozens of stabs 31 .
30 On 26 July the Council of Ten added to the condemnation of 1584 a reward of 2,000 ducats to whoever would kill him outside the state. Whoever produced proof of murder -which meant displaying the head of the condemned on the public rock of the proclamationwould obtain, in addition to a reward, full liberation for another two convicts; such benefits were equally acknowledged to the accomplices that had participated in the crime of Cresole. Lastly, the closest relatives of the victim were enfeoffed with all of Ludovico's property -including land that had already been auctioned off for 1,000 ducats and despite the fideicommissa and other oppositions -in compliance with the provisions set forth by the law of 1578.
31 Heading up a strong rank of followers, Ludovico continued his dedication to raids and crimes, sowing terror. His criminal career would conclude tragically with his death in the autumn of 1586, when some of the members of his band, enticed by the thought of the proceeds they would receive, killed him in his sleep, along with four of his accomplices 32 . One of these was the noble Marco Loschi, whose criminal career had parallelled that of Ludovico. The existential journey which led these men to become ruthless criminals was not dissimilar from the experiences of many during these times. Their fate as victims in the wars among major competing families represented the tragic difference.
32 On 14 May 1578, the Council of Ten put an end to the imprisonment served by Muzio da Porto for wounding Guido Capra. One month later the trials of brothers Marco and Nicolò Loschi were forwarded to the Avogaria. They were charged with several significant violations. The two brothers, supported by some of their bravos, had injured the nobles Nicolò Caldogno and Achille Trissino and assassinated the noble Lelio Banca, their enemy, by complete surprise. The petty crimes of which they were accused revealed more about their perverse nature. In an earlier procession of the Corpus Domini, these men bullied their way into a group of marching women, touching them in indecent fashion and using heavy and blasphemous language. One innkeeper, whose wife had been raped, was beaten, so he tried to escape by fleeing to a local leper hospital. In addition to being exposed to highly contagious sick people, the man was actively pursued inside the unfortunate huts of the dying 33 .
33 It appears that the family of Marco and Nicolò were also implicated in the feud: Giulio Trissino and Lelio Banca had testified in favour of Guido Capra in the trial for the injury to Iseppo dal Castello. The strategy of the Loschis on this occasion was typical: at the proclamation convened to charge the prisoners with their crimes, the brother facing the lesser penalty appeared, while the brother charged with the more serious crimes was absent. After having spent four years in pre-trial detention, Nicolò Loschi was condemned for vitae moribus to four years of confinement in Candia. Marco and one of his bravos, failing to appear in court, were at the time already banned in perpetuity, and their property was confiscated for the advantage of the relatives of Lelio Banca. 34 The rivalry with the Bancas apparently led Marco, pursued by outlaws and enemies, to set fire to their palace situated in the village of Noventa on the night between the third and fourth of July 1586. For this last crime, on 2nd August, he was condemned with his bravo Francesco Lanza to be bannedin perpetuity with a reward of 1,000 lire set on his head. Despite he was noble, if captured he would not be decapitated but shamefully hanged. In that period Ludovico da Porto and his bandits made their way to Grancona, a small village not far from Noventa, to accomplish a criminal act which was supposed to alienate their parents' solidarity: the kidnapping of one of their cousins, Alessandro da Porto, in order to obtain a ransom from their family 34 .
35 Ludovico was becoming an expert, as we shall see, in the art of burning buildings. But he did not participate in the enterprise in Noventa. Only in the middle of August, until the end of their lives, did the path of destiny for these two nobles, apparently so very much alike, meet tragically. The "ferocity of a hearth" 37 The key passages for understanding the career of the hero and bandit Count dominate his existence and, one might say, determine it. The imperial diploma that bestowed the title of Counts to the family in 1532; the testament of his grandfather, the so-called Leonardo the posthumous in 1545; the feud with the Capras; his involvement against the Turks and the battle of Lepanto (1571) which, by rehabilitating him from the condemnation of 1567, had turned him into an icon of military glory of the lineage; the publication of the paternal will (1573); the testament of his uncles Paolo, the canon, published in 1571, and Simone, the archdeacon (1577); the crime of Cresole and the second condemnation (1579)
37
. 34 The escape from confinement to Crete and the assassination of the Curate, which followed the irredeemable exile of 1585 -but also the Law of the Five Cases and the peace with the Capras that made him an outcast -led to a whirlwind of succeeding events in the last years: the exile of January 1586, the kidnapping of cousin Alessandro Nevertheless, the event that most significantly characterized Ludovico was his break with his lineage who abandoned him to his fate once they sensed the threat he represented to his patrimony, to the unstable balance of powers among Vicenza's different social classes, and to Venice's powers which were laboriously being restored. At a given moment, his own family, perhaps more than his declared enemies, was anxiously awaiting his demise.
39 At least twice, at the end of August and then again in November 1585, Ludovico violated his exile and penetrated the territory of Vicenza with dozens of his men in order to bring fire and death to its enemies. The first time, after his presence had been signalled, he had to take refuge by crossing the border of the state; of the second occasion, we read the extraordinary account of Garzadori: 40 Blind with rage, his anger did not spare all the confiscated property from destruction, property which the old fideicommissa had indissolubly tied to the lineage and that his relatives would certainly try to recover
41
. But perhaps what disturbed him most and may have appealed to his most basic sense of self -he, the hero of Lepanto -was his existence as a marginal pawn in the games of ruthless familial strategies; his being used as a belligerent, exalted as a great symbol at one moment, but abandoned to his destiny in the end. On such occasion we have a first clear sign of his self-destructive anger 42 . 41 The small villages of Cresole and Vivaro constituted the nucleus of the da Porto title of Counts. They enjoyed immense prestige -possibly greater than their riches -which, nevertheless, had been acquired in recent time. The 512 hectares which they owned in Vivaro were occupied by the family only in 1491, thus they had to be defended with any means necessary. The most prestigious of all these possessions, which included the tower, was bestowed to Camillo thanks to the testament of Leonardo the posthumous in 1545. From Camillo, it was passed on to Ludovico, the only male heir, in 1573 43 .
42 But the division of the resources of Vivaro and Cresole among the three sons of the deceased Leonardo was not consumated without difficulty. In 1554, the podestà of Vicenza was compelled to consult three arbiters to settle the disputes among five competing heirs
44
. Of these, Paolo and Simone were the two outstanding personalities in the panorama of the Vicenza's churchlife. Paolo,at a particular moment of his life, had developed a promising diplomatic career 45 . Although rather old, he had waged a serious conflict against the bishop Matteo Priuli in defense of the privileges of the cathedral chapter and above all of the numerous benefits which he enjoyed. The suspension a divinis and the excommunication of Paolo -which accompanied the publication of the diocesan synodmarked the beginning of the Tridentine reform in Vicenza. Paolo would therefore be subjected to a humiliating reconciliation and the renunciation of his benefits and privileges
.
43 Although the reason is still unknown, it is not difficult to imagine that the beating of the vicar of the bishop, on 4 May 1567 is somehow related to these events 47 . The episode had revealed the violent nature of the young man who believed he could ingratiate himself with his uncles, old, rich and of course without a direct line of descendants. The young men must have seen their uncles as men qualified to restore a notable patrimony, largely free of conditions, to the family. Therefore, the nephews waited for the publication of their secret wills with particular apprehension. But bitter disillusion was to frustrate such expectations. Paolo had died in August 1571 and in his last will, drawn up two years before, he had instituted an arrangement of primogeniture benefiting the descendants of brother Giovanni, but excluding the firstborn Leonardo who, at that time, was taking up his ecclesiastical career, and Ludovico as well. The publication of Simone's will, which occurred in 1577, favored the firstborn male children of Giovanni, while Ludovico was mentioned by his uncle as the last possible heir in a long chain of heirs from Leonardo the posthumous' family branch 48 .
44 Maybe the two prelates had imagined that the nature of Ludovico, and the lack of scruples in Leonardo, would produce fateful consequences for the patrimony of the family, as had happened in 1579 when Ludovico, as previously noted, had murdered a peasant from Cresole and Leonardo had pretended to marry a wealthy widow from Venice only to steal her resources. Both would be condemned, among other things, to the confiscation of their wealth 49 .
Strategies to defend social rank (1) 45 The man who, in 1545, forged the nearly sacred tie between familial prestige and patrimony was eighty-year-old Leonardo the posthumous
50
. His experience in the city's administration and his exposure to legal culture helped make his will a turning point where the defense of the patrimony was the premise through an eloquent defence of wills and fideicommissa: 46 Naturally, the exclusion of women and the establishment of a very strict fidei-commissum over free properties followed; the old jurist did not fail to prohibit every deduction of the Falcidian portion on bequests. Thus, only a number of infinite replacements should remedy the potentialdemographic disasters that the future generations of the family might experience. In the end, he included another patrimonial tutelage disinheriting the heir who had been condemned to confiscation 51 . 47 In spite of limitations set by both statute and common law and some jurisprudential adjustments, the document retained a large measure of its original efficacy as a strong legal support to the sanction of the individual will. While the "spiritual will" enjoyed a revival within the Catholic countries during the Counter-Reformation 52 , other wills occasionally were drawn up to change the structure of legitimate succession 53 ; especially after the middle of the sixteenth century, another type of will was to appear, resembling much Leonardo's will a will which was above all political and whose most important purpose was to protect the patrimony and the family prestige. By betraying conventional practice and the laws of succession established by the majority of statutes -which prescribed a joint succession for all male heirs -the institution of primogeniture, which we saw in the wills of Paolo and Simone da Porto, represented the final phase of this process
54
. 48 The replacement of the heir, praised by Leonardo in 1545, was more flexible than a formal disinheritance yet more structured than some indefinite recommendation, which helped control the patrimonies conveyed to descendants. The most important form of replacement was the fidei-commissum: on accepting the inheritance, the heir bound himself, at the time of his death, to return the testator's properties to one or more people shown in the will, usually his own male descendants 55 . The necessity of the restitution commanded the preservation of the properties. The Trebellianica deduction (legitime portion), which corresponded to one-quarter of the legal assets, was thus acknowledged to the heir via the ius commune and several other statutes 56 .
49 The fidei-commissumwas already common in wills among the nobility during the fifteenth-century. Besides imposing it on their properties, testators often used the fideicommissumto remind heirs about the precedents established by the forefathers. In 1477 Giovanni Francesco da Porto recalled the precedents established by his ancestor Francesco (1404) and by his father Simone (1462) 57 . During the sixteenth-century the institution became more precise and detailed; the less and less commonly used formula, which replaced one heir with another one on the basis of vulgariter, pupillariter et per fideicommissum, was counteredby the revealing prose of Leondardo da Porto the posthumous.
Strategies to defend social rank (2) 50 After the first confiscation suffered by Ludovico in 1584, his relatives had established a nominee to acquire the resources auctioned off from Rialto
58
. After the murder of the Curate, the Council of Ten annulled the sale and enforced confiscation of the property subject to a fidei-commissum provided for by the 1578 law that enfeoffed with the property of the convicted criminals the relatives of the victims 59 . A great many things seemed destined to end up in the hands of the family's enemies -property and estates composed of flat, fertile land, woods, a manor with tower, as well as a number of stables filled with animals 60 . The fears that forty years earlier were originally felt by the patriarch were about to be realized. The lawyer Lucillo Cereda, brother of the priest, had almost immediately gained possession of Ludovico's properties, while he was to face an attempted vendetta in November
61
. 51 His relatives wasted no time, putting together a defensive front by defending the estate promised as dowry payment in the marriage of Ludovico's sisters: the two brothers-inlaw were claiming a total amount of 4,300 ducats to be paid immediately as a compensation for the dowries. The requests of repayment presented to the Avogaria from those claiming the confiscated patrimony 62 -the so-called contraddizioni (contradictions) -were about fifty and amounted to approximately 10,000 ducats 63 . On May 29 and June 14, the requests of the brothers-in-law were accepted, although Ludovico was still terrorizing the surroundings of Vicenza 64 . Only after his death would his relatives -as direct successors -be able to reclaim the rights relevant tothe fideicommissa and attempt to salvage their parts of the patrimony.
52 Nevertheless, the astuteness of Lucillo Cereda, which can be easily explained through a powerful influence of the Capras upon him, allowed him to pursue the da Portos with the fideicommissa of his ancestors. Following the legislation on confiscation, the fideicommissum could undermine the survival of the bandits' families because of a dangerous contradiction existing in the fidei-commissum itself. If no bonds or ties existed, only the capital and properties of the outlaw at the moment of his crime -or the legitime portion if the child was stilldepending on his father -would be subject to confiscation. With the 1578 law, expropriations of wider, broader proportions became possible. Whoever was invested with a feud was equally intended to take on loco haeredis all the rights of the confiscated; besides that, the fidei-commissum might have left other rights dormant knowing that sooner or later they would reemerge to benefit in the situation. If, for example, a collateral branch was bereft of male descendants, the extraneous, the enemyand it was exactly within this type of case that the actions of Lucillo Cereda fell -would have been able to claim the share of property subject to the fidei-commissumwhich would normally be judged as due to the bandit, thus striking the collateral branches.
53 The exceptional measures regarding confiscation therefore risked producing the opposite effects of those intended by the legislators. The political instability they hoped to combat could be amplified by such action and those who faced the problem of patrimonial guardianship, particularly after the measures of 1578, were well aware of this consideration. Therefore, a further warning to the new generations may have been necessary focusing on the one hand on the inflexible authority they might face and, on the other, on a new measure which represented a further legal trench against confiscation: the disinheritance of the bandits
65
. 54 The sentence of the Avogaria of 13 October 1588, favorable to Cereda, was contradicted by the Council of Ten who, on 20 February 1589, reached a conclusive sentence according to which those who represented the victim were not to be considered as heirs of the property subject to a fidei-commissum.
55 The exemplary case I have examined can be seen as a manoeuvre of adjustment from the Venetian authorities. The contradictory decisions taken by the two courts involved in these questions, the Council of Ten and the Avogaria, lead us to believe that the problems confronted by these bodies were not readily solvable by routine solution.
56 The da Portos, therefore, began to prepare a counteroffensive examination in the hopes of reclaiming at least part of the familial patrimony that had ended in the hands of Lucillo. The announced results were comforting: a note regarding properties and resources once owned by Ludovico, but later possessed by Lucillo Cereda, declared them to be worth 11,000 ducats. Once the fideicommissa were deducted -an issue upon which new legal battles had been enacted -the adversary would be entitled to resources which were worth only 2,000 ducats.
57 Meanwhile, the clash spread to wider fronts. The obstinacy with which Cereda protected his acquired rights induced the da Portos to cause further troubles. In 1608 Lucillo reported suffering from endless persecutions. The farmers from Cresole hated Lucillo because he had cultivated some fields that were previously used for unlawful pasturage. When Lucillo refused to build a bridge, the farmers cut down four hundred oaks, a protected arboreal species used for the construction of the fleet, so he found himself charged by the judging magistrate of the Venetian arsenal. Lucillo certainly knew the protections which induced them to act so recklessly. 60 The resistance of Arpalice was to be useless. At an initial sentence dated 17 September, 1635, the feudal investiture was revoked. Then a series of defeats would follow; in the end, a refund for the improvements on the lands funded by her father failed to gain recognition. With the final documents of 1640, the podestà of Vicenza ordered the seizure of two hundred fields which, until that time, had been illegally occupied by the woman 67 . The recovery of the resources confiscated from Ludovico had forced three generations of his relatives into a long battle that consumed fifty-five years before ending in victory.
Conclusion 61
The examined strategy in defense of patrimony was successful and succeeded in containing the damages involved with confiscation. The role played by the Republic accounts for a number of variables which, though not always evident, resulted from the internal dialectic within Venice's ruling class.
62 During the eighties of the sixteenth-century, increased political weight achieved by the so colled youngs 68 evoked, at least implicitly, that ancient notion of family that enjoyed great fortune in the earliest stages of expansion of the Republic. An idea founded upon the risks and the potential connected with the accumulation of the resources and on the division of the portions of inheritance that ignored the fideicommissa and encouraged individual enterprises. Furthermore, the separation of legal powers between Venice and the mainlandseemed to fall in line with the increasing, and apparently irreversible, centralization of power into the legislative organs and judicial institutions controlled by the Dominant
69
. These developments may have encouraged the criminal legislation that the opposite family pattern -based upon the conservation of landed property and promoting rivalry and disorder -intended to strike with force.
63 However, the lineage was quickly perceived as a fundamental prerequisite for the survival of the state, being the base of oligarchic power and its relative stability. The fideicommissa were strongly respected within the Republic of Venice
70
. In 1786, Goethe was surprised at how the fideicommissa Enjoy great favor in the Venetian state; a property which was once countermarked in such a way, may be conserved in perpetuity and, although the property has passed through many hands, by discussing the controversy before the judges the descendants of the original family are always in the right and in the end the resources must be expropriated to their advantage 71 . 64 In this context, the law of 1578 struck the future heir when it was not able to strike the property holder, but, as a matter of fact, it only marginally touched the fidei-commissum.
65 What, then, had made the law of confiscations a decisive passage in the criminal politics of the Serenissima? The answer emerges with great evidence in the case of Ludovico da Porto: the enfeoffing of the confiscated property to the victims' relatives deals with the abolition of the discretionary spaces of negotiation that allowed the culprits to obtain an onerous pardon from the family of the plaintiff; on the other. If this allowed us to affirm that by acting in such a way the central power annulled the effects of the compensatory mechanisms of the feud, we should also add that a similar measure made it more difficult to retrieve the confiscated goods. The lineages were very likely to be deprived of the symbolic connotation that described them, and their political prestige would therefore be belittled. 66 We must then consider the possibility that threats directed against the fideicommissa appear as a space for political negotiation; a space still available in the dialogue between the various players. The judge, the verdict, the guilty, were single and isolated elements, but the consequences of the verdicts, which fell back on the parental groups, marked the institution as being a fundamental ring of conjunction between the vindicatory system and the inquisitorial one. If the original political legitimacy had progressively been lost, now one could, by appealing perhaps to the services rendered, invoke the protection of the central power; in 1588 the da Portos obtained immediate satisfaction after having humiliated themselves and implored for the cancellation of the Avogarescan verdict destroying their patrimony 72 .
67 What else, finally, of the disinheritance clause of the bandit-heir that Leonardo da Porto the posthumous had inserted in his last act of will and testament? In the period considered in this essay, the clause was originally diffused in noble testaments often marked by a certain legal awareness, supportive of the fideicommissa, but also protective of the free portions of the inheritance
73
. On the contrary, nowhere in the contradictions introduced in Venice in the confiscation suffered by Ludovico, the clause was invoked; thus, we may infer that the very same people were perfectly aware of its legal inefficiency. It would be necessary to verify such a thing more distinctly, but it may be that, in Vicenza's civil courts of first instance -where actions on fideicommissa were immediately conveyed, and where members of the aristocracy were seated to judgethere existed some sort of awareness of the existence of ineffective clauses. We may also imagine that the relatives of the victims did not always have the strength and resouces to appeal to Venice. They might also not care. A local judgement implicitly reestablished the compensatory logic for which the fideicommissary trustee, reuniting in himself the dual nature of heir and descendant of whom the proprieties had been confiscated, had on one side the right to the restitution of the assets but, on the other, he was held responsible for reimbursing the price 74 . Thus the "clause", which implicitly strengthened the callback expressed from the fidei-commissum to the traditional ideological values that supported the lineage, assumed in itself a certain character of consolidation: in other words, the "clause" consolidated a building from the inside, while the fidei-commissum had the task of safeguarding that building from the outside.
68 Leonardo da Porto the posthumous was a man of solid experience in worldly matters and a man who understood the secrets of power. With far-seeing insight, in 1545 he had been able to anticipate the fate of his lineage as a complex obstacle course. The cautious attitude of the old patriarch often seemed to fall apart under adverse fate. But nearly a century after that exemplary testament, which protected the family patrimony thanks to a fidei-commissum and a defensive clause, and despite Ludovico's and some other descendants' condemnations 75 , the strategy that had been enacted proved to be unassailable and the enterprises of bandit Ludovico da Porto could be forgotten. In contrast, the short biography that Giacomo Marzari dedicated in 1591 to the hero of Lepanto in his History of Vicenza stood as a reminder against the wear and tear of memory and generations: 1569, December 31 Last will of Paolo da Porto, the canon (published at his death in 1571). Martin, Romano (2000, pp. 2-5) ; see also Grubb (1988, pp. x-xi, 10-13) .
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ABSTRACTS
In the later sixteenth century the Venetian state suffered from widespread criminal violence.
Government set harsher penalties and in 1578 even authorized confiscating condemned criminals' fideicommissa, assigning their property to murder victims' relatives. Outlaws' families therefore had to use subtle legal defence, since this law affected their wealth but also their honour and feuding's compensatory mechanisms.
Count Ludovico da Porto, bandit and hero, symbolizes the power struggle among Vicenza's main noble families; his experience and the confiscation of his property exemplify Venetian action to control the turbulent mainland state, proving the long-term efficacy of the exceptional measures taken.
Pendant la deuxième moitié du XVI e siècle, la République de Venise était bouleversée par une violence généralisée. En 1578, après quelques lois qui aggravaient les peines, l'État parvint à confisquer les fidéicommis des coupables, assignant leurs biens aux familles des victimes.
Les maisons des nobles malfaiteurs eurent recours alors aux défenses légales les plus subtiles, car cette loi frappait leurs richesses aussi bien que leur honneur et les mécanismes de compensation du droit de vengeance.
Le comte Ludovico da Porto, héros et bandit, symbolise le conflit parmi les familles de la haute noblesse à Vicence. Ses vicissitudes et l'histoire de son patrimoine confisqué mettent en lumière l'efficacité dans le temps des mesures extraordinaires adoptées par la Serenissima et son rôle de contrôle sur les périphéries agitées.
